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      Our firm emphasizes intellectual property litigation (including trademarks, trade secrets, copyrights, and patents), internet law, startups, complex business litigation, class actions, videogame law, business law, employment litigation, consumer protection litigation, and personal injury/tort litigation. We are actively involved in cutting edge electronic discovery ("e-discovery") matters and Ira P. Rothken is an active member of the Sedona Conference and maintains a blog at on electronic discovery and evidence issues for legal professionals. Here is a CNET News Story Profiling Ira P. Rothken's Career Protecting Internet Technology Companies.

      We Have Assisted in the Startup of Some of the Most Successful E-Commerce and Electronic Entertainment Companies in the World

      Ira P. RothkenIn addition to our robust litigation practice we assist electronic entertainment, high technology, and e-commerce companies in their business, startup, and legal transactions. For example, since the inception of the "commercialized" internet in the mid 1990s, we have represented some of the largest and most successful web sites in the world on a huge range of matters from startup issues to risk reduction strategies to e-commerce policies and agreements. In many instances we were called upon to handle issues where there was no clear precedent and thus we had to innovate a solution.

      We have also helped start numerous successful electronic entertainment and videogame companies including Nihilistic Software, Pandemic Games, Telltale, and Arenanet. Ira P. Rothken, a member of IGDA, has spoken multiple times on how to start a videogame development company at the Computer Game Developers Conference (CGDC). Here is a sample of videogame development transactions in which we assisted our clients:



      Artem Vaulin Files Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss

      On November 18th, 2016 Artem Vaulin filed a reply in support of his motion to dismiss the indictment arguing, amongst other things, that "making available" mere torrent files is insufficient to constitute criminal copyright infringement.

      The full reply brief can be found here.


      Here is an excerpt from the reply brief:

      I. Introduction
      In his Opening Memorandum, defendant Artem Vaulin identified major defects in the Indictment in this case, including:
      (a) duplicitous allegations of (1) non-criminal activity of running a torrent site with (2) unspecified crimes committed while running quite different “direct download sites;”
      (b) failure to allege even a single actual criminal infringement occurring within the territory of the United States; and
      (c) violations of constitutional principles of separation of powers and due process and of prudential principles of copyright law that prohibit the prosecution from inventing new crimes of “running a torrent site” or “encouraging copyright infringement.”1
      The Response of the United States is to ignore Vaulin’s constitutional and prudential authorities (see Response at 6-7) and to declare that “the proper vehicle for challenging the sufficiency of the government’s evidence is a trial, not a motion to dismiss an indictment properly returned by the grand jury.” (Response at 1.) The failure of the Response to address defendant’s showing of an improper indictment tacitly admits the impropriety. For example, the failure to allege even a single copyrighted work uploaded, stored, or downloaded to/from such “direct download sites” is not a mere administrative issue it is fatal to the indictment for criminal copyright infringement. The general video streaming alleged in the indictment cannot be prosecuted as a felony. There is no crime of making available a torrent file.
      This prosecution violates guidelines set forth in a “Prosecuting IP Crimes Manual” publically posted by the Department of Justice. 2

      Sections 26(j) and (v) in the indictment discuss the approximately 11 copyrighted “works in suit” or the works alleged to be criminally infringed and it is limited to allegations of torrent files found on a torrent search engine site in 2016 – most notably not which was apparently off line by 2011. No actual infringers or infringements and the factual basis for felony direct infringements were alleged in the indictment. The Response fails to counter the overwhelming authorities provided in the motion to dismiss that the storage or transfer of dot torrent files is not direct infringement.

      More fatal to the indictment - there are no facts alleged that such works were uploaded, stored, or downloaded from “direct download sites.”

      Notwithstanding the government’s erroneous theories of criminal copyright infringement appeared to seize activity outside the applicable five year criminal copyright statute of limitations period cut off and the indictment appears to contain an error that cannot be reconciled with the government’s own sworn evidence.3 There is little effort to tie with sufficient alleged facts, beyond speculation, the above 2016 torrent site to Artem Vaulin rendering the entire indictment improper.

      In another attempt to criminalize torrent sites, the Response asserts a theory of “aiding and abetting,” presenting various historical citations. (Response at 7-8.) But aiding andabetting was removed from the Copyright Act by Congress in 1976 thereby eliminating the crime. The only Federal Court to consider the issue, LaMacchia, supra n. 1, set forth an integrated historical review and stated that: “In 1976, Congress revamped the Copyright Act by eliminating the crime of aiding and abetting copyright infringement.” (871 F.Supp. at 539.) See also Manta, Irina D., The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 469, 481 (2011) (“Several years later, countering what had been a trend of expansion in the area of criminal sanctions, the Copyright Act of 1976 eliminated the provisions for aiding and abetting . . .”).

      The government argues that KAT’s operators “sought out infringing material and trumpeted that to their users, targeting the infringement minded with rewards and honors for posting torrents for copyright infringement material...the indictment sufficiently alleges that defendant entered into an agreement with others to commit copyright infringement, and aided and abetted the copyright infringement of others.” (Response at 14.) The government alleges that defendant “facilitated and promoted” copyright infringement. (Id. at 11, quoting Indictment § 1(b); see also Response at 13 (“encourage, induce, facilitate”). The Indictment and the Response thus allege an invented crime of “encouraging or inducing copyright infringement” — which is the essence of a civil claim arising out of Judge made case law, especially MGM Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005) as discussed in the Opening Memorandum at 9.

      The aiding and abetting theory, while not applicable due to its elimination by Congress from the Copyright Act, will be addressed arguendo below, and it does not justify invention of a new crime of “encouraging copyright infringement.” Aiding and abetting is applied to an accessory to an actual crime committed by a principal and no such actual crime is alleged in the Indictment.Apparently, under the prosecution’s aiding and abetting theory, actual perpetrators of statutory crimes are potentially scattered among the “millions of individuals in the United States” alleged in ¶ 4 of the Indictment to have had access to KAT. There is no actual perpetrator identified in the Indictment whom defendant Vaulin might have aided or abetted and no specifications of elements of actual statutory copyright crimes. There is no allegation that supports the nature of any primary infringement one is left to guess if a user left the KAT site and later, in the Bittorrent network generally, was engaged in activity that could be punishable as a misdemeanor or through civil liability or one that cannot be punishable at all such as being “extraterritorial”. Defendants cannot commit a felony, as articulated in the indictment, by conspiring or aiding and abetting a KAT user to commit no infringement or an extraterritorial infringement, misdemeanor infringement, or civil infringement. An investigator downloading a torrent file and then leaving the site behind to create in the Bittorrent Network a content file does not pass muster for a felony. See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 166 D. Mass. 2008 (stating that copyright holder’s investigator’s “own downloads are not themselves copyright infringements because it is acting as an agent of the copyright holder, and copyright holders cannot infringe their own rights”).

      This Court should decline the government’s invitation by implication to find that the general Bittorrent ecosystem and “network” and unknown users are copyright felons under US law or that Bittorrent technology and the network are not protected by the Sony doctrine where they are a dual use technology capable of substantial non infringing uses.

      Indeed, beyond the failure to raise a proper direct infringement, conspiracy, and aiding and abetting theory of copyright infringement, the failure to allege facts to support that the direct infringements occurred in the United States is also fatal to all the counts. The Court in Subafilmsarticulated the limited reach of US jurisdiction arising from the Copyright Act:

      “Even assuming arguendo that the acts authorized in this case would have been illegal abroad, we do not believe the distinction offered by Appellees is a relevant one. Because the copyright laws do not apply extraterritorially, each of the rights conferred under the five section 106 categories must be read as extending "no farther than the [United States'] borders." 2 Goldstein, supra, § 16.0, at 675. See, e.g., Robert Stigwood,530 F.2d at 1101 (holding that no damages could be obtained under the Copyright Act for public performances in Canada when preliminary steps were taken within the United States and stating that "[t]he Canadian performances, while they may have been torts in Canada, were not torts here"); see also Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 668 F.2d 91, 93 (2d Cir.1981) (reversing an order of the district court that required the defendant to surrender prints of a film because the prints could be used to further conduct abroad that was not proscribed by United States copyright laws).”

      The indictment not only fails to alleged sufficient facts to support direct infringement occurring in the United States but fails to allege sufficient facts to support that the mere torrent files for the “works in suit” or “works in the indictment” came from servers in the United States or servers tied to Artem Vaulin. The government cannot equate having a US domain name or US email server to having servers in the United States for the dot torrent files at issue. In addition, the torrent files allegedly related to the “works in the indictment” were apparently obtained in 2016 from foreign servers.

      The indictment, distilled to its essence, is based on 11 torrent files downloaded from a foreign server in 2016 with a speculative relationship to Artem Vaulin based on someone’s use of the name “kickasstorrents” in relation to the site.

      Defendant is charged only with “making available” and “enabling,” not with actualinfringements. (Response at 15-16.) The government cannot conflate KAT’s automated “making available” a torrent file with a speculative subsequent knowing and willful direct copyright infringement offense against the United States.

      In sum, the attempt to hold KAT’s overseas torrent sites as accessories to unspecified copyright crimes committed in unknown ways in the United States by unknown former KAT users is unprecedented and violates multiple constitutional prohibitions. The indictment is so permeated with improper legal theories and insufficient predicate facts to support the elements of felony criminal claims - from improperly conflating dot torrent files into direct criminal infringement to improperly alleging video streaming as a crime that it cannot be trusted that the grand jury was properly instructed with the correct law and legal principles to render a competent decision. Given the problems with the indictment the Court ought to provide extra scrutiny and less deference.

      The government initially argues that, in an exercise of discretion, the Court should delay ruling on the motion until defendant personally appears. Defendant has been arrested and incarcerated for a non-existent crime of “making available” 11 torrent files. The government seeks to shield its wrongful inventions of new crimes from judicial scrutiny for a protracted period by charging overseas defendants and by invoking the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. That doctrine is based on inherent powers of the court; such powers should not be subverted for the abusive purposes of this prosecution.

      Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss should be granted at the earliest opportunity.




      Artem Vaulin Files Motion to Dismiss US Indictment: The reproduction and distribution of mere torrent files does not violate criminal copyright statutes

      On Monday evening Artem Vaulin filed a Motion to Dismiss the United States Indictment in Federal Court in Chicago, Illinois. Mr. Vaulin argues in the motion that the reproduction and distribution of mere torrent files does not violate criminal copyright statutes. The indictment attempts to hold the purported operator of a torrent search site that is devoid of content files, criminally responsible for the acts of users who go elsewhere to allegedly infringe on copyrighted materials. Under civil copyright law, a person who does not directly use or distribute copyright infringing materials, but aids others in doing so, may be held secondarily liable for infringement. However, “secondary copyright liability” of persons who encourage or induce infringing activities of third parties is only a common-law civil theory of liability that cannot be criminally prosecuted absent an express act of Congress. Congress, however, has declined to enact such legislation.
      Below is an excerpt from the motion to dismiss.
      This case arises out of an erroneous theory of criminal copyright law that attempts to hold defendant Artem Vaulin criminally liable for the alleged infringing acts of the users of KickAss Torrents and the other torrent websites alleged in the indictment to be under Vaulin’s control (collectively referred to as “KAT”).
      Indeed,this case involves an untested theory of first impression for purported criminal copyright liability.
      Websites like KAT are devoid of content files. Instead, KAT is nothing more than a search engine, no different in any material way from Google and other popular website search engines, except that KAT indexes BitTorrent files. Computerized operations at torrent sites acquire, store and distribute uncopyrighted “torrent files” or “torrents.” A torrent file “contain[s] instructions for identifying the Internet addresses of other BitTorrent users.” (Indictment at ¶ 1(a)).
      Thus, at its core, the indictment merely alleges that visitors to KAT may take advantage of KAT’s automated search processes to search for and locate “dot torrent” files. Such files contain textual information assembled by automated processes and do not contain copyrighted content. After the visitor leaves the KAT website the visitor may stop and do nothing. Or, after leaving the KAT site, the visitor may choose to use the data in the torrent files identified in a search. However, such use depends on the visitor acquiring and using “thin client” BitTorrent software that users independently download and install on their own computers. Using such third-party software, the visitor may use BitTorrent files that work like links to download materials such as content files, but only if such materials are at that very moment actively being hosted and constructed by other BitTorrent users located elsewhere on the Internet. The fundamental flaw in the government’s untenable theory of prosecution is that there is no copyright protection for such torrent file instructions and addresses. Therefore, given the lack of direct willful copyright infringement, torrent sites do not violate criminal copyright laws.
      The indictment attempts hold the purported operator of a torrent search site that is devoid of content files, criminally responsible for the acts of users who go elsewhere to allegedly infringe on copyrighted materials. Under civil copyright law, a person who does not directly use or distribute copyrighted materials, but aids other’s in doing so, may be held contributorily liable for infringement. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005). This is known as “secondary” infringement. However, “secondary copyright liability” of persons who encourage or induce infringing activities of third parties (Indictment at ¶ 3) is only a common-law civil theory of liability that cannot be criminally prosecuted absent an express act of Congress. Congress, however, has declined to enact such legislation. Therefore, one cannot criminally conspire to violate a civil common-law copyright prohibition under Grokster and its progeny as it is not an offense against the United States.
      Moreover, the indictment also fails to specifically allege that any copyrighted media was downloaded or otherwise infringed within the territory of the United States. This too is critical because the U.S. copyright laws do not protect against extra-territorial infringement. Nonetheless, the indictment merely – and insufficiently – alleges that conduct at issue made copyrighted content “available” to “millions of individuals in the United States.” (Id. at ¶4). Merely “making” copyrighted materials “available” in the United States does not establish actual necessary infringements in the United States.

      Cato Institute and Institute for Justice File Amicus Brief supporting Megaupload defendants 

      The Cato Institute and Institute for Justice filed an Amicus brief today in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals supporting the Megaupload defendants' request for rehearing en banc to reverse findings of Fugitive Disentitlement.

      The following is a short summary of the Cato-IJ Amicus brief. The full Amicus brief can be found here.


      The panel’s construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1355 expands federal jurisdiction and fundamentally alters the nature of a long standing doctrine of American law— in rem jurisdiction—with no clear statement from Congress. In addition, the panel’s construction raises serious doubts as to the constitutionality of the statute ignoring this court’s precedent. Further, the panel compounds this mistake by upholding 28 U.S.C. § 2466, which unconstitutionally cuts off the right to an essential constitutional protection—the due process of law—creating dangerous incentives for abuse by law enforcement...
      ...With the broad expansion of jurisdiction the panel adopted, the government’s elimination of due-process rights via the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine is alarming. Under the panel’s reading, anyone who has ever been online and happened to have payments routed through American servers could be subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Couple this de facto universal jurisdiction with the ability to invoke fugitive disentitlement in civil forfeiture proceedings, and this court could ratify a dangerous mix of perverse incentives and unchecked government profiteering. These concerns are hardly speculative. Over the course of the past two decades, it has become clear that forfeiture abuse is directly tied to whether law enforcement agencies and officials can profit from the seizures. This court should not make it easier for further misuse to occur. See Marian R. Williams, Jefferson E. Holcomb, et. al, Policing for Profit, Institute for Justice (Nov. 2015).
      The Supreme Court has only ratified the use of fugitive disentitlement in criminal appeals for certain limited purposes. Because those purposes can’t be extended to fugitive disentitlement in civil forfeiture proceedings, § 2466 serves no purpose except to strip claimants of due-process rights.



      Kim Dotcom files Petition to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for rehearing en banc

      Today our US legal team on behalf of the Megaupload defendants, including Kim Dotcom, filed a Petition to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for rehearing and rehearing en banc on the issues of forfeiture of assets and fugitive disentitlement. The case is entitled US v Finn Batato. 

      An excerpt of the Petition is below. The entire Petiition can be found here.

      Petitioners seek en banc review of a 2-1 ruling that conflicts with the precedents of this Court, the Supreme Court, and other circuits on issues of importance to the scope of federal jurisdiction over foreign property and civil forfeiture law.
      The case arises from a separate criminal case—the largest criminal copyright case in U.S. history—in which the government indicted several foreign defendants. Instead of following typical procedures—extraditing the defendants and then proving its case at trial before seeking forfeiture—the government took a much more aggressive approach. It brought this civil forfeiture case against foreign property owned by the defendants and others (collectively, “Claimants”) and, relying on the so-called “fugitive disentitlement” statute, argued that the owners’ claims to their property should be stricken and the property forfeited without a trial on the merits.
      This foreign property, however, is under the sole control of foreign courts that have not followed U.S. orders. The district court recognized that these courts “may or may not” respect its forfeiture order (JA-1982), and the government admits that “even with a valid forfeiture order, the fugitive’s property may suffer no adverse effect” (Br. 20 n.13). Even after the judgment below, these courts have released millions in assets to Claimants. As one of the courts put it: The “harsh- ness” of the district court’s “fugitive disentitlement” order finds “no place in [its] law” (JA-2197), and any U.S. request that “require[s] [its government] to ride roughshod over [its] own laws” is unenforceable. JA-2199, 2207. In short, the order below is not binding on those controlling the property—it is advisory.
      Yet, over Judge Floyd’s careful dissent, the panel held that Article III did not limit the district court’s exercise of in rem jurisdiction, disentitled Claimants from receiving any hearing on their ownership interests, and adjudged their property forfeit. That divided ruling conflicts with the precedents of this Court, the Supreme Court, and other circuits on three major issues.
      First, under this Court’s precedent, “[o]nly if the court has exclusive custody and control over the property does it have jurisdiction over the property so as to be able to adjudicate rights in it that are binding against the world.” R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver, 171 F.3d 943, 964 (4th Cir. 1999) (Titanic I); R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. The Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 435 F.3d 521, 530 (4th Cir. 2006) (Titanic II); see Dissent 57 (Addendum B). Here, the property is controlled by foreign courts not bound to obey a U.S. forfeiture order, so such order is “a hypothetical judgment”—an unconstitutional “advisory opinion.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998).
      The panel dismissed Titanic I and II as “admiralty” cases. Op. 12-15. But nothing in those cases suggests that the Court’s Article III analysis was so limited. As Judge Floyd recognized, the cases “contain principles both of admiralty law and of constitutional law.” Dissent 57. En banc review is needed to ensure uniformity in this Court’s decisions, and to avoid a conflict with Supreme Court precedent.
      Second, the panel’s decision conflicts with the Second Circuit’s holding that the plain text of 28 U.S.C. § 1355 (Addendum A-1) provides for subject-matter jurisdiction, venue, and service of process in forfeiture cases involving foreign prop- erty, but does not (and could not) “fundamentally alter well-settled law regarding in rem jurisdiction.” United States v. All Funds on Deposit in Names of Meza or De Castro, 63 F.3d 148, 152 (2d Cir. 1995). After all, absent “control over [the foreign] property,” “[a] forfeiture order directed against such property [is] wholly unenforceable.” Id. In holding that § 1355 “dispenses with this traditional re- quirement” of control (Op. 8), the panel invited this result and deepened a circuit split. See Dissent 50 (Meza “reach[ed] the opposite conclusion”).
      Third, the panel’s holding that due process allows the government to seize Claimants’ property without an adversarial hearing conflicts with both Supreme Court precedent holding that “a court in a civil forfeiture suit [cannot] enter judg- ment against a claimant because he is a fugitive from ... a related criminal prosecution” (Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996)) and circuit precedent holding that “barring [claimants’] right to defend” civil forfeiture suits violates due process (United States v. $40,877.59, 32 F.3d 1151, 1154-57 (7th Cir. 1994)).
      Even apart from the foregoing conflicts with precedent, the panel’s divided ruling raises issues of exceptional importance. By stacking allegations of fugitive status on top of allegations of forfeitability, the government can obtain an unprecedented, roving worldwide license to indict foreign citizens who have never lived or worked in the United States and forfeit their foreign property—all without proving any wrongdoing or having control over the property. Review is warranted.



      Leading BitTorrent Search Engine Defends Itself Against DOJ's Experimental Criminal Copyright Claims

      In July of 2016 the United States Department of Justice brought a criminal complaint against Artem Vaulin for allegedly violating criminal copyright law arising out of the KickAssTorrents search engine. The DOJ started their case with a press release while at the same time having Polish authorities arrest and put Mr. Vaulin in jail so as to impede his ability to work with US counsel on his own defense. Mr. Vaulin has the presumption of innocence especially in an experimental case of first impression involving search engines, torrent files, and criminal copyright law. Mr. Vaulin's legal team requested in a letter this week that the DOJ dismiss the criminal complaint and free Mr. Vaulin from prison.
      Below is an excerpt from our letter requesting that the DOJ dismiss the criminal complaint against Artem Vaulin providing the view that the criminal claims fail as a matter of law.


      Summary. The Criminal Complaint in combination with the Affidavit of the Homeland Security Investigator, together referred to herein as the “CC”, fail to properly allege a crime as a matter of law. There is no showing of probable cause for the alleged offenses or for any offense.  This alleged criminal copyright case arises out of an erroneous theory of criminal copyright law advanced by the United States that attempts to hold Artem Vaulin ("Defendant") criminally liable for the alleged infringing acts of KAT's search engine users. Discussion of Mr. Vaulin’s involvement in KAT shall await another day. Distilled down, in terms of technology, nothing more is alleged in the CC than that a visitor to defendants' alleged "KickAssTorrents" ("KAT") site can take advantage of automated search processes embodied there to search for and locate "dot torrent" files. Such files contain textual information assembled by automated processes and do NOT contain copyrighted content. After leaving the defendants' alleged websites, the visitor may stop and do nothing or use the data in such torrent files in conjunction with third party "client" software; and that pursuit may, according to the desires of the user and the uncertain nature of the availability of third party files on the internet, lead to both infringing and non-infringing files being constructed that are located elsewhere on the Internet. By the time any possible primary infringement by a former KAT visitor could ever occur the visit to the site is long over.The indictment does not even come close to alleging direct "willful" copyright infringement as KAT contains and transmits no content files.  Defendants cannot be held criminally responsible for what users do after they leave the KAT search engine behind.  The Copyright Act does not criminalize secondary copyright infringement.  17 U.S.C. § 506; see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 930, 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2776, 162 L.Ed.2d 781 (2005) (hereinafter "Grokster") (noting that the Copyright Act does not expressly create any secondary liability).  The Criminal statute at issue namely Section 506 only imposes liability for direct, willful infringement that causes specific damages.  17 U.S.C. § 506(a). The government’s copyright conspiracy theory for similar reasons fails as a matter of law. Such a conspiracy theory is little more than a novel back door attempt to improperly argue judge made civil secondary infringement in a criminal case. Trying to hold KAT criminally responsible for the entire global BitTorrent network does not pass muster.

      The CC defects are breathtaking in scope and include failures in alleging geographical location and date of alleged offenses, conspiracy, willfulness and/or commercial advantage or gain.Although the CC categorically alleges that offsite downloads were "unauthorized," there is no specific allegations of the who, what, where, when, why, and how of any actual unauthorized downloads and no allegations to support criminal willful infringement.The absence of allegations of specific unauthorized downloads or direct infringements in the complaint is not inadvertent:  rather it is a side effect of how far removed defendant is from the potential infringing event and it is part of an improper criminal complaint that purports to impose presumptive criminal liability on a BitTorrent search engine for alleged offsite infringements. It is also a sign that the government is eager to improperly introduce concepts of judge made civil law into a criminal statutory analysis.

       The Affidavit is replete with incorrect, misleading and irrelevant allegations regarding BitTorrent technology and how KickAssTorrents was operated. Blanket allegations of a similar kind were lodged in the Seventh Circuit, where this case was filed, in Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2012) and were found to be inadequate in a civil context.  Civil cases such asFlava Works have rejected contentions that operators of informational websites such as KAT have a duty to monitor or supervise uses of information obtained from their sites. Most of the accusations in the CC could equally be lodged against the site inFlava Works named MyVidster and even the Google search engine.

       The Affidavit fails to identify even one specific infringement committed within the last 180 days by someone in the United States of America, other than by HIS Special Agents.  (See ¶ 19 of the Affidavit.)   The Affidavit fails to connect automated operations of KAT servers with criminal knowledge or willfulness on the part of Defendant as to any copyright infringement in the United States, such as infringements of “Captain America:  Civil War” alleged in Count Three of the Criminal Complaint and apparently referenced in the foregoing ¶ 19 of the Affidavit. There can be no criminal copyright infringement under US law for infringements occurring outside the United States. It is an "'undisputed axiom that United States copyright law has no extraterritorial application[.]'" Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc'ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1001 (1994) (quoting 3 David Nimmer & Melville B., Nimmer on Copyrights § 12.04[A][3][b], at 12-86 (1991)). According to ¶ 40 of the Affidavit, KAT servers for “Subject Domain 4” of KAT operations that are referenced in ¶ 19 were located in Canada.  

      We address separate issues below.  We urge you to dismiss the case.


      1.      Torrent Technology.

      BitTorrent technology is a kind of decentralized peer-to-peer file-sharing that is well suited to distribution of files, such as software upgrades, videogames and videos.  There are many independent legitimate creators who depend on BitTorrent technology.  Like any other dual use technology BitTorrent technology is “dual use” and can be used for good and bad purposes.  The BitTorrent technology at issue in this case is capable of substantial non infringing uses and is therefore protected by the Sony Doctrine.

      An important principle of torrent technology is the “swarm,” which is comprised of individuals sharing and acquiring a file.  One individual, called the “seed,” provides the original copy.  Other individuals, called “leeches,” each acquire a piece of the seed’s file and then exchange pieces among themselves.  A file may be broken up into dozens of pieces that are exchanged by individuals.  In a large swarm, several seeds may appear.  Individual join a swarm, share pieces amongst themselves and finally acquire a whole file, often thereafter leaving the swarm.

      “Torrent files” maintained on a torrent site such as KAT are text files that provide information pointers into the BitTorrent network. Torrent files thus serve a similar function to hyperlinks but are more attenuated.  Unlike hyperlinks where a click on the link can obtain a desired jump to another internet destination, such as an html “page” or pdf file, torrent files are more removed from the target. In order to use a torrent file, one must download the torrent file, leave the torrent search engine site, open up a third party "thin client" software to read the text information in the torrent file, and at some point initiate involvement in the global BitTorrent Network. This process can be automated by the end user by adjusting settings on the third party software. Once a user downloads a torrent file it leaves KAT behind.

      A “torrent site” provides a search engine of torrent files.  Towards that end, KAT provides a searchable index of torrents like that of other search engines. 

      Another online torrent component, a public “tracker,” enables computers using the BitTorrent protocol to contact each other.

      Neither a torrent site nor a tracker ever stores, copies, or transmits copyrighted materials. 

      Inadequacy of the Affidavit is demonstrated by comparing its charges with objective facts of torrent technology.  Paragraph 19 of the Affidavit inaccurately states:  “Between on or about June 24, 2016, and on or about June 30, 2016, HSI Special Agents downloaded from the Northern District of Illinois the following prerelease movies from KAT (at Subject Domain 4).”   There was no movie or other content on KAT that could ever be downloaded and therefore no direct infringements could have occurred on KAT. Perfect 10, Inc. v., Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 717 (9th Cir. 2007) (party from whose site content is actually transmitted and subsequently displayed on the end-user’s screen is responsible for display, not search engine that merely links to that content). Infringements that occur after users, including HSI Special Agents, leave the KAT site behind cannot be criminally actionable against KAT.         

      2.      Allegations that Defendant Himself Willfully Infringed Copyright in the United States are Devoid of Substance.

      Counts Three and Four of the Criminal Complaint allege that Defendant himself committed criminal copyright infringement in the Northern District of Illinois by willfully distributing copyrighted works.  The only copyrighted work identified in Counts Three and Four is “Captain America: Civil War,” referenced in paragraph 19, discussed supra.  There is no evidence to support the allegations as “Captain America: Civil War” or as to any specific work. The lack of evidence is not surprising given that the KAT technology did not store or transmit any content. If a user committed copyright infringement, it is only after they left the KAT servers behind.

      It is settled that liability for direct copyright infringement cannot be based on provision of information services to individuals that such individuals use to commit infringement. More specifically it is also well settled law that mere hyperlinks and their more attenuated cousin, torrent files, cannot constitute direct copyright infringement. In brief, because KAT did not copy anything or transmit content, it cannot be charged withdirect copyright infringement.  See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v., Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 717 (9th Cir. 2007) (party from whose site content is actually transmitted and subsequently displayed on the end-user’s screen is responsible for display, not search engine that merely links to that content); Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1202 n.12 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“hyperlinking per se does not constitute direct copyright infringement because there is no copying.”);Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 4660(SHS), 2002 WL 1997918, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002) (linking to content does not implicate distribution right and thus, does not give rise to liability for direct copyright infringement);Ticketmaster Corp. v., Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1344, 1346 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (“[H]yperlinking does not itself involve a [direct] violation of the Copyright Act (whatever it may do for other claims) since no copying is involved. . . . [It] is analogous to using a library’s card index to get reference to particular items, albeit faster and more efficiently.”);Bernstein v. JC Penney, Inc., No. 98-2958 R EX, 1998 WL 906644, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 1998) (granting motion to dismiss on the ground that hyperlinking cannot constitute direct infringement).

      On or about April 7, 2016 the Court of Justice in the EU ruled that defendant’s provision of hyperlinks on the Internet that lead to publicly available files on third party servers does not constitute direct copyright infringement. (GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV, Playboy Enterprises International Inc., Britt Geertruida Dekker). The EU Court of Justice would likely rule that torrent files that lead to publicly available files on third party servers do not constitute direct copyright infringement. To the extent that there is a dual criminality analysis in Poland this, amongst other things, makes any extradition request highly dubious.

      The failure to properly allege direct infringement is fatal to the government’s claim. Even in cases where a defendant is criminally charged with actual copying or direct infringement the standard is extremely high. The copyright statute itself indicates the higher level of knowledge and intent in a “willfulness” mental state. “Evidence of reproducing and distributing copyrighted works does not, by itself, establish willfulness.” See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2).  Willfully” as used in 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) connotes a “voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.” United States v. Liu, 731 F.3d 982, 990 (9th Cir. 2013).  Proof of the “defendant's specific intent to violate someone's copyright is required.”Id. at 989-90. 66.  Liu further holds that a general intent to copy is insufficient for criminal copyright liability. Id. at 991.  If 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)’s willfulness requirement were read “to mean only an intent to copy, there would be no meaningful distinction between civil and criminal liability in the vast majority of cases.” Id.  “[W]illful infringement requires a showing of specific intent to violate copyright law.” BC Tech., Inc. v. Ensil Int’l Corp., 464 Fed. Appx. 689, 696 (10th Cir. 2012). The language of the statute and interpretation by the courts teaches us that ignorance of the law is a defense. 

      The government has not properly alleged willful infringement against any person who has used KAT.

      In the instant case the government’s case fails at the threshold as KAT was not involved in copying or transmitting any content and cannot be a direct willful infringer as a matter of law.

      3.      There is No Criminal Liability for Secondary or Indirect Copyright Infringement.

      The Affidavit appears to base criminal charges on allegations and legal doctrines that are limited to the context of civil proceedings pursuant to theories of secondary or indirect copyright infringement.  Secondary liability in civil copyright law is a common law creation made by judges. SeeSony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984) (“The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another.”);Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 794-95 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Contributory copyright infringement is a form of secondary liability with roots in the tort-law concepts of enterprise liability and imputed intent.”);Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 291-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“Federal copyright law, unlike patent law, does not expressly create any form of derivative, third-party liability.”).

      Erroneous allegations in the Affidavit include references to theDigital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512 or DMCA.  Among other provisions, the DMCA establishes a “safe harbor” from civil liability for online service providers (“OSP”), namely, a statutory defense against civil infringement claims.  See Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. Youtube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 2012 BL 84337, 102 U.S.P.Q.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 2012).

      Alleged failures to comply with the conditions of a DMCA civil defense does not create a criminal cause of action.  There is no Act of Congress establishing a crime for violations of the DMCA safe harbors.  The DMCA is a defense in the civil context of contributory and vicarious liability for copyright infringement committed by third parties and of liability for intentionally inducing third parties to commit copyright infringement. 

      The Government knowing that Judge made civil law for internet secondary copyright infringement could not be applied in the criminal statutory context is attempting to use the vague and novel theory of criminal “conspiracy” to try to argue it through a back door and such arguments fail as a matter of law.  There is a scarcity of judicial opinions in contested criminal copyright cases that discuss how a criminal conspiracy theory could apply to mere internet hyperlinks or torrent files/trackers. The government by throwing against the wall the criminal conspiracy theory without any statutory support from Congress is trying to argue Judge made civil common law by analogy. Common-law civil liability principles cannot be extended to impose criminal liability.  Crimes must be specifically defined by Congress.  Federal crimes “are solely creatures of statute.” Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985); accord United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267 n.6 (1997) (“Federal crimes are defined by Congress, not the courts . . .”).  In copyright law in particular, “the deliberation with which Congress . . . has addressed the problem of copyright infringement for profit, as well as the precision with which it has chosen to apply criminal penalties in this area, demonstrates anew the wisdom of leaving it to the legislature to define crime and prescribe penalties.” Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 228 (1985). 

      As Justice Blackmun observed inDowling, copyright is an area in which Congress has chosen to tread cautiously, relying "chiefly . . . on an array of civil remedies to provide copyright holders protection against infringement," while mandating "studiously graded penalties" in those instances where Congress has concluded that the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions are required.Dowling, supra at 221, 225.  "This step-by-step, carefully considered approach is consistent with Congress' traditional sensitivity to the special concerns implicated by the copyright laws."Id. at 225.

      TheDowling court also stated: “It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime”) (quotingUnited States v. Wilberger, 5 Wheat. 76 (1820)).  “Accordingly, when assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute, [courts] must pay close heed to language, legislative history, and purpose in order strictly to determine the scope of the conduct the enactment forbids.”  Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 213, 228-29 (1985).  In determining whether Congress intended to criminally proscribe a particular act, a “narrow interpretation” is appropriate. Id.

      The absence of a crime of secondary copyright infringement is further evidenced by Congress’ repeated - and so far unsuccessful - attempts to pass legislation aimed at conduct the Government is prosecuting here. See S. 968 - 112th Congress: Protecting Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act (2011) (aimed at websites that link to infringing materials); S. 3804 - 111thCongress: Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act (2010) (proposing to authorize the Justice Department to file an in rem civil action against a domain name used to access an Internet site or sites “dedicated to infringing activities.”). 

      In a large-scale perspective, fundamental principles of due process preclude the Government from criminally charging defendants for acts that previously only constituted, at most, civil liability under principles of secondary or indirect copyright infringement arising from Judge made law. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (“[D]ue process bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its scope.”) In doubtful cases of criminal charges, the Supreme Court applies “the rule of lenity,” which requires a court to interpret ambiguous statutory schemes in favor of defendants. See,Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 410 (2010) (“ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity”). The government should not be given free reign to make up new theories of secondary criminal copyright liability in the internet or hyperlink/torrent file realm by calling it “conspiracy” or any other term – especially when one would have to guess where civil secondary copyright infringement ends and criminal copyright conspiracy begins and Congress has been asked to act and declined.

      4.      There is No Specific Evidence that Defendant Conspired with Others to Willfully Infringe Copyright in the United States.

      Even if one assumesarguendo that a criminal copyright conspiracy can be alleged it fails as a matter of law. Count One of the Criminal Complaint alleges conspiracy to commit copyright infringement. A conspiracy charge contains three elements: (1) "an agreement between two or more persons to act together in committing an offense," (2) "an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy," and (3) "[t]here must be some showing that the defendant knew the conspiracy's purpose and took some action indicating his participation." United States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 109 (4th Cir. 1990).  See, United States v. Kingrea, 573 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (dismissing indictment that "failed to state an offense against the United States as the object of the conspiracy."). 

      The Government must show a union of criminally willful conduct on the part of an actual infringer and criminally willful conduct on the part of a conspirator or “double willfulness”.  Evidence that KAT acted willfully to directly infringe is insufficient if it does not unite with underlying and offsite direct infringements that are also willful.  See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a);United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1324 (5th Cir. 1975) (dismissing indictment that failed to allege willfulness);Med. Supply Chain, Inc. v. Neoforma, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1328 (D. Kan. 2006) (civil complaint).  “Even if civil liability has been established, without the requisite mens rea it does not matter how many unauthorized copies or phonorecords have been made or distributed:  No criminal violation has occurred.”  The required agreement between conspirators need not take a particular form, however, there must be some genuine meeting of the minds as to commission of a crime:  merely engaging in a business transaction is not sufficient to charge the crime of conspiracy.  As one court explained, ordinary retail businesses are not engaged in a conspiracy with their customers merely because they engage in repeat or standardized transactions.  See,United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 567-68 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding no conspiracy because “[i]f you buy from Wal-Mart your transactions will be highly regular and utterly standardized, but there will be no mutual trust suggestive of a relationship other than that of buyer and seller.”). 

      Any infringements that could possibly occur would have to occur after a user left the KAT site behind. There is no allegation of direct communication between Defendant and any direct infringer, and no probable cause for accusations that Defendant or KAT entered into a relationship with any user that involved anything other than “highly regular and utterly standardized” automated processes of the torrent file search engine and the tracker servers. There is a lack of evidence of actionable agreements, willful primary infringements, and overt acts. This is not surprising given how attenuated the KAT site was from any offsite infringements.There can be no criminal conspiracy to violate the judge made civil law in Grokster and its progeny. The alleged prior judgments are irrelevant. The conspiracy statute under 18 U.S.C. 371 makes clear that the object of the conspiracy must be an offense or fraud against the United States. Therefore, there can be no criminal conspiracy to commit a mere civil copyright infringement as a matter of law.

      The government is alleging a novel theory that if allowed to succeed gives too much discretion to prosecutors using vague allegations to engulf large parts of the internet, such as the Google search engine and BitTorrent network. Such a novel criminal law theory, placed under the lens of Dowling, ought to be subject to debate by Congress and implemented, if at all, through legislation where competing benefits and burdens on the growth of the internet can be properly debated and analyzed.

      5.      Copyright Infringements Are Actionable Only If They Occur in the United States.

      It is an “‘undisputed axiom that United States copyright law has no extraterritorial application[.]’”Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1001 (1994) (quoting 3 David Nimmer & Melville B.,Nimmer on Copyrights § 12.04[A][3][b], at 12-86 (1991)); see Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co. Ltd., 34 F.3d 246, 249 n.5 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that the Copyright Act is “generally considered to have no extraterritorial application”);In re Outsidewall Tire Litig., 2010 WL 2929626, at *8 (E.D. Va. July 21, 2010) (citing with approval the Ninth Circuit’s extraterritoriality analysis inSubafilms). 50. “For the Copyright Act to apply, ‘at least one alleged infringement must be completed entirely within the United States.’”Elmo Shropshire v. Canning, No. 10-CV-01941-LHK, 2011 WL 90136, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2011) (quoting Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 990-91 (9th Cir. 1998)); accordRundquist v. Vapiano SE, 798 F. Supp. 2d 102, 126 (D.D.C. 2011).

      Inadequacy of the Affidavit is again demonstrated.  Servers for “Subject Domain 4” referenced in Paragraph 19, supra, are located in Canada.  (Affidavit, paragraph 40.)  The only activities that are alleged in that paragraph to have occurred in the United States are activities of HSI agents.The government has the burden of proof on this US territoriality issue and there is a wholesale lack of evidence in the CC.

      6.      The Money Laundering Claims Lack Merit

      Count Two of the Criminal Complaint alleges money laundering.  Allegations are dependent on charges of criminal copyright infringement as there are no illegal proceeds without an underlying crime.  Given that the complaint fails to properly allege any type of criminal copyright claim, the money laundering claims fails as a matter of law.   There is no showing that earnings of Defendant were the result of or causally related to actionable criminal copyright infringements occurring in the United States.